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Abstract
More often than not, recently popular structuralist interpretations of physical theories leave the
central concept of a structure insufficiently precisified. The incipient causal sets approach to
quantum gravity offers a paradigmatic case of a physical theory predestined to be interpreted in
structuralist terms. It is shown how employing structuralism lends itself to a natural interpre-
tation of the physical meaning of causal sets theory. Conversely, the conceptually exceptionally
clear case of causal sets is used as a foil to illustrate how a mathematically informed rigorous
conceptualization of structure serves to identify structures in physical theories. Furthermore,
a number of technical issues infesting structuralist interpretations of physical theories such as
difficulties with grounding the identity of the places of highly symmetrical physical structures
in their relational profile and what may resolve these difficulties can be vividly illustrated with
causal sets.
Keywords: causal set theory, quantum spacetime, structural realism, structure
Re-ignited by John Worrall in 1989 as a response to pessimistic challenges of scientific realism based
on historic sequences of false theories,1 structural realism is currently all the rage in the general
philosophy of science. Structural realism—ontically understood—has also risen into prominence
as a template to interpret contemporary physical theories over the past decade or so. The former
project was, and, to a lesser degree, still is, plagued by notorious difficulties in explicating the
notion of ‘structure’ independently of an ex post facto identification of structure as that which
is preserved through scientific revolutions.2 The latter project is typically exhausted by showing
that, at least in some respects, the basic constituents of a physical theory are merely structurally
identified as they fail to possess some individuality or intrinsic identity.
Starting out from a rigorously defined set-theoretic characterization of structure in Section 1,
this essay explicates its application to a physical theory, hoping to contribute to an understanding
of both these projects. The physical theory to be investigated is causal set theory, an approach
to finding a quantum theory of gravity. The main idea behind the causal set approach is to strip
spacetime down to its essentials (or less), impose discreteness as an expected quantum signature,
∗I wish to thank Fay Dowker for discussions, and Craig Callender and two anonymous referees for comments on
an earlier draft. At my own peril, I have not heeded all their advice. This project has been funded in part by the
American Council of Learned Societies through a Collaborative Research Fellowship, the University of California
through a UC President’s Fellowship in the Humanities, and the University of California, San Diego through an Arts
and Humanities Initiative Award.
1Cf. e.g. Worrall (1989, 117 and 121).
2More recently, Worrall has explicated the structure of a theory in terms of its Ramsey sentence (cf. Worrall and
Zahar 2001). It is unclear, however, whether this type of structural realism can evade Newman’s famous objection
(cf. Ladyman 2009, §3.2)
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and try to obtain a complete theory of quantum spacetime based on these simple assumptions. Even
though the approach is still in its infancy and offers less than a complete theory, its conceptual
clarity and power elicits admiration and promises to wipe a clean slate when many feel that large
parts of established physics will need to be given up in an attempt to obtain a fundamental theory
of quantum spacetime. Section 2 will introduce the main ideas of the theory and discuss its
two biggest challenges: to formulate a quantum dynamical law and to understand how general-
relativistic spacetimes emerge from the fundamental structure as postulated by causal set theory.
The reason why causal set theory is of interest to the structuralist is because of its conceptual
simplicity and the resulting ease of characterizing the relevant physical structure it postulates and
the existence of which the structuralist wants to defend in case a realistic attitude towards it will
be warranted. Although others have gestured towards structuralist interpretations of causal set
theory, its full explication has hitherto not been offered—it shall be explicated in Section 3. In the
same section, a recently mounted challenge for spacetime structuralism (Wu¨thrich 2009) shall be
transposed into the context of causal set theory, and different strategies to address the challenge
are evaluated.
In Section 4 finally, we shall go for bigger prey and discuss the larger issue of the tenability
of structuralist interpretations of scientific theories in the light of the results of Section 3 and
considerations concerning how they may or may not generalize. In particular, this essay draws a
sharp distinction between a structuralist interpretation of a particular physical theory on the one
hand and structural realism as a wholesale recipe to offer a Third Way between the Scylla of the
pessimistic meta-induction and the Charybdis of the no-miracles argument. It will conclude that
the foregoing considerations support the former (modulo the difficulty of dealing with causal sets
of high degrees of symmetry), but do not at all—or only weakly—support the latter.
1 The set-theoretical conception of structure
The structuralist analysis of the failure of standard scientific realism in the face of the pessimistic
meta-induction concluded that the reason why standard scientific realism did not escape its devas-
tating force was because it insisted on an ontology of ‘things’.3 In effect, the pessimistic argument
was able to unleash its full potency because standard versions of scientific realism read off the
surface ontology of objects from the theory only too readily. Consequently, the structuralist con-
cluded, once the realist steers clear of objects and limits her ontological commitment to the deep
structure postulated by the theory at stake, then this realist commitment will not be frustrated
by a succession of theories with rather different surface ontologies. The problem then, of course,
was to independently identify the deep structure a theory postulated. While this issue did not
see much progress during the 1990s—and sometimes enjoyed frustratingly scant attention in the
literature—, it was usually assumed to be captured by the similarity of the relevant equations,
following Worrall (1989).4 The mathematical structure of equations often does of course grasp the
structure of what is postulated by the theory to physically exist, but it should be noted that the
mathematics of a theory alone can be very similar for completely dissimilar physical ‘stuff’, while
theories trading in more or less the same physical existents may be formulated in terms of rather
different mathematics. In fact, one and the same theory may afford distinct mathematical formu-
lations with correspondingly distinct mathematical structures.5 What ultimately has to matter to
3Henceforth, I confine myself to ontic structural realism (cf. Ladyman 1998).
4More often than not, this assumption was only implicit or, at best, gestured at. A laudable exception is Bain
and Norton 2001.
5It has been argued that this very fact constitutes an argument in favour of structural realism (Ladyman 1998,
418ff; Bain 2006). While I concur with Jones (1991) that this creates a problem for someone who is predisposed to
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the structural realist is the physical structure towards which we are asked to entertain a realist
attitude.
Regardless of what exactly a structure was, structural realist sometimes insisted, and a few
continue to insist,6 that their analysis showed that there couldn’t fundamentally be any objects.
Instead of fundamental objects, they claimed, “it’s relations all the way down”—in Stachel’s (2006,
54) memorable paraphrase of Saunders’s (2003, 129) “it is turtles all the way down”—notably
without there fundamentally being any relata to exemplify these relations. More specifically, it
is claimed that whatever relata may exemplify the relations “always turn out to be relational
structures themselves on further analysis.”7 Many have complained that such a proposal was simply
unintelligible.8 This is not the place to rehearse the standard moves along this well-troden path.
Suffice it to mention that the standard, set-theoretic conceptualization of structure necessitates the
simultaneous postulation of relations as well as their relata.9
Let’s explicate this set-theoretic notion of structure, then. The usual, albeit typically tacit,
concept of structure assumed in philosophy is that of a relational structure, i.e. a set-theoretic
notion found in mathematical logic according to which a structure S is an ordered pair 〈O,R〉
which consists of a non-empty set of relations R (‘ideology’) as well as a non-empty set of relata
O (‘ontology’), the domain of S. More generally, a structure consists of a set of elements together
with a collection of finitary functions and relations defined on the set. More precisely, a structure
A is an ordered triple 〈A,Rn, Fn〉 consisting of a domain (or universe) A, a (usually countable) set
Rn of n-ary relations, and a (usually countable) set Fn of n-ary functions.
10 The domain A of A,
sometimes also denoted dom(A), is just an arbitrary, usually non-empty, set. A function f is n-ary
just in case there exist sets X1, ..., Xn, Y such that f : X1 × · · · ×Xn → Y , where X1 × · · · ×Xn is
the Cartesian product of X1, ..., Xn. The Cartesian product X1 × · · · ×Xn of X1, ..., Xn is defined
as the set of all ordered n-tuples 〈x1, ..., xn〉 such that for all i = 1, ..., n, xi ∈ Xi. An n-ary relation
defined on sets X1, ..., Xn is a set of ordered n-tuples 〈x1, ..., xn〉, where xi ∈ Xi for all i = 1, ..., n.
Thus, an n-ary relation on sets X1, ..., Xn is just a subset of the Cartesian product X1 × · · · ×Xn
of these sets.11 Without loss of generality (see footnote 11), we confine ourselves to relational
structures, i.e. to structures with Fn = ∅.
This standard notion has recently received critical scrutiny from various authors. Leitgeb and
Ladyman (2008) explore a graph-theoretic notion of structure,12 and Roberts (2011) proposes
a group-theoretic one. Landry (2007) argues for conceptual pluralism in that a restriction to
read off the ontology directly from the formalism, I remain unconvinced that this lends support to structural realism,
for reasons similar to those given by Pooley (2006, §4.2).
6E.g. French (2010).
7Ladyman (1998, §4). It should be noted that Stachel (2006) does not advocate this position.
8For a representative list, cf. Bain (forthcoming, §2).
9It seems to me that a category-theoretic notion of structure in the sense of Bain (forthcoming) is the only
promising path to a possible extermination of the relata from what exists fundamentally, even though I remain
sceptical that it can ultimately succeed (cf. Lam and Wu¨thrich 2012).
10Even more precisely, given that the distinction in mathematical logic between relations and functions on the one
hand and symbols representing them on the other, a structure can be defined as the ordered 5-tuple 〈A, R¯n, F¯n, ar, I〉
consisting of a domain A, a set of n-ary relations symbols R¯n, a set of n-ary function symbols F¯n, a function
ar : R¯n ∪ F¯n → N0 which assigns a natural number (including 0) called arity to every symbol in Rn ∪ Fn, and an
interpretation function I assigning functions (and constants) and relations to the symbols in F¯n and R¯n. In what
follows, I shall speak loose and fast in that no distinction will be made between a symbol σ and its interpretation
I(σ).
11 For those with a penchant for ever higher levels of generality, (n-ary) functions can also be defined as ((n+1)-ary)
relations.
12Note, however, that a graph-theoretic rendering of what it is to be a structure may reasonably be considered
a form of representing a set-theoretically defined structure, rather than offering an alternative, and inequivalent,
characterization. For more discussion of structures and their representations, cf. Lam and Wu¨thrich (2012).
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the standard notion (or any one notion, for that matter) cannot do justice to the plethora of
applications. Muller (2010) makes the case that a thoroughgoing structuralism should not rely on
a conceptualization of structure that rests on a definition in terms of more basic concepts. Instead,
he argues, structure should be given as a primitive, encoded in an axiomatization. Since the set-
theoretic notion, however, is both standard and adequate given my purposes, the focus shall be on
it in what follows.
For our work below, it will become important to be able to compare structures. In particular—
and this also matters to the structural realist who wants to escape the pessimistic meta-induction
by identifying structures that are preserved through successions of theories—, we need a notion of
structural identity, i.e. we need some criteria as to when two structures are ‘identical’. Since we
are interested in physical structures, and these structures can only be in re,13 we need a conceptual
apparatus to articulate how two physical ‘things’ existing in the same possible world, or how the
physical existents in two different possible worlds (or sets thereof), can have the ‘same’ structure.
For instance, the inter-mundial version of structural identity is required to determine whether
the physically possible worlds according to one theory are structurally identical to those worlds
possible according to its successor, or at least partially so. In other words, it appears to be needed
to precisify the structural continuity that a structural realist asserts of successive scientific theories.
Roughly, a ‘homomorphism’ is a ‘structure-preserving’ map from one structure to another. If
a bijective homomorphism has an inverse that is also a homomorphism, then we say that it is an
‘isomorphism’. Isomorphisms are usually used to capture the structural identity we are seeking:
two structures A and B are structurally identical just in case they are isomorphic, denoted A ' B,
i.e. iff there is an isomorphism from A to B. Note that this sense of identity is weaker than that of
(strict) identity, since in general dom(A) 6= dom(B). An isomorphism from a set onto itself is an
automorphism. In this case, the domains are identical.
To state all of this somewhat more rigorously, suppose we are given two structures A and B with
the same set of relations defined over their (generally distinct) domains.14 A homomorphism from
A to B is a map φ : A→ B which preserves the functions and relations, as follows: (i) for any n-ary
function f in Fn and any elements a1, ..., an ∈ A, φ(f(a1, ..., an)) = f(φ(a1), ..., φ(an)); and (ii) for
any n-ary relation R in Rn and any elements a1, ..., an ∈ A, (a1, ..., an) ∈ Rn ⇒ (φ(a1), ..., φ(an)) ∈
Rn. A bijective map φ : A→ B is called an isomorphism just in case both φ and its inverse φ−1 are
homomorphisms. Two structures A and B are called isomorphic, denoted by A ' B, or structurally
identical, iff there exists an isomorphism ι : A→ B. If A ' B and A = B, then we say that A and
B are automorphic and the relevant isomorphism is called an automorphism.
This concludes our brief statement of the set-theoretic notion of structure. We are now ready
to see it applied in a concrete case.
13As opposed to ante rem, to use Shapiro’s (1997) distinction. In re structuralism maintains that the physical
system which exemplifies a certain structure is ontologically prior to the abstract mathematical structure, i.e. the
isomorphism class of ‘identical’ structures. In contrast, ante rem structuralism maintains that abstract structures
exist and are ontologically prior to any physical exemplification of it (or at least ontologically independent of them).
14An attentive reader may wonder how purely extensionally defined relations may be the ‘same’ if defined over
two different sets. This difficulty is circumvented in the more precise language of mathematical logic where symbols
denoting relations are distinguished from the relations they denote. Strictly speaking, therefore, the signatures of the
two structures (i.e. their sets of relation symbols) must be the same, but not, of course, the interpretation of these
symbols.
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2 Introducing causal sets
The relevance of quantum effects and the presence of strong gravitational fields in the early universe
as well as in black holes necessitates a quantum theory of gravity, i.e. a theory that combines
(possibly classical) gravity with quantum theories of matter in order to describe their interaction.
To many—though not to all—, this means to quantize gravity, i.e. to formulate a theory that either
results from some regimented quantization procedure applied to the classical gravitational field
or directly relies on postulates which codify the quantum structure of the gravitational field or
of spacetime. The causal set theory attempts the latter: it encodes in its two kinematic axioms
the basic idea of the quantum analogue of spacetime as something essentially discrete that is
structured by causal relations and hopes to show that at appropriately large scales, this discrete
quantum structure approximates the smooth metric manifolds that represent spacetime in general
relativity. Thus, the founding principle of causal set theory is the idea that the fundamentally
discrete structure consists of a partially ordered set of elementary events, and that this ordering is
essentially causal.15
Even though the discreteness and the fundamental role of causality are stipulated ab initio
in causal set theory, it is of course not the case that this stipulation is unmotivated. Important
results in the 1970s made it clear that in general relativity, the causal structure of a spacetime
determines its geometry (but not its ‘size’). Theorems by Hawking et al. (1976) and Malament
(1977) established that given the causal structure and volume information, one finds the dimension,
the topology, the differential structure, and the metric of the manifold. These results kindle the
hope that minimal assumptions concerning causality at the fundamental level may suffice to recover
almost all the requisite structure we care about in general-relativistic spacetimes and thus motivate
the causal sets approach in assuming that the fundamental structure is a ‘causal set’.
The discreteness is justified, advocates of the approach claim, by both physical as well as tech-
nical reasons. Among the latter, it is argued (in Henson 2009, 394) that the lack of short-distance
cut-offs in the relevant degrees of freedom leads to a host of infinities in general relativity and quan-
tum field theory and that at least those infinities not resolved by renormalization are best cured by
assuming a smallest spatial distance. But these difficulties—at least in general relativity—simply
result from insisting on forcing general relativity on the Procrustean bed of perturbation theory, an
insistence dropped in so-called background-independent approaches such as loop quantum gravity
and causal dynamical triangulations. Similarly, technical problems in defining path-integrals on a
continuous history space can be avoided by assuming fundamental discreteness. Quite generally,
Henson (ibid.) argues, discreteness affords a conceptual utility in that it often significantly reduces
the technical complexities physicists face. But without a metaphysical commitment to the sim-
plicity of nature, there is no reason to think that the actual world is fundamentally discrete just
because assuming so mitigates our mathematical struggles.
But there are also physical motivations for believing that the fundamental structure may be
discrete. First, what Henson considers “perhaps the most persuasive argument” (ibid.) is that
without a short-distance cut-off, the finiteness of the semi-classical black hole entropy cannot be
obtained. For this argument to be persuasive, however, the importance of keeping the black hole
entropy finite must be accepted. Suffice it to point out that the Bekenstein formula for the black
hole entropy is derived in semi-classical quantum gravity, i.e. by mixing and matching physical
15The original paper that got everything started is Bombelli et al. (1987), even though there are clear historic
precursors in Myrheim (1978) and ’t Hooft (1979). For serviceable reviews of the causal sets approach, cf. Dowker
(2005), Henson (2009), and Reid (2001). As far as I am aware, the philosophical reception is exhausted by brief
discussions in Butterfield (2007, §5.2), Earman (2008, §7), Smeenk and Wu¨thrich (2011, §8), and Stachel (2006,
§3.7).
5
principles of which we cannot be certain will be licensed by a full quantum theory of gravity. To
be sure, the confluence of independent lines of reasoning to Bekenstein’s functional expression for
the entropy of black holes is suggestive. But this argument from black hole entropy to discreteness
could be turned around; i.e. it could be argued that given that the full quantum theory of gravity
trades in a continuous fundamental structure, Bekenstein’s formula cannot be right. A second
physical reason is offered by Reid (2001, 6): the local conservation of energy suggests that photons
with infinite energies do not exist and an effective way of ascertaining this is by assuming that
time—and therefore, by relativity, space—is discrete. No doubt this is a possibility; but in itself,
it falls short of offering a conclusive argument.
The most puzzling justification for discreteness comes also from Henson (ibid.). Since various
approaches to quantum gravity assume, suggest, or entail that the fundamental structure is discrete,
he argues, it is only reasonable for causal set theory to postulate discreteness. But of course, these
competing theories will not be true if causal set theory is; so why should this lend any credence
to causal set theory? Perhaps the idea is to show that given the agreement of rather diverse
programmes in that the fundamental physical structure is discrete, we should be confident in what
they concur on. But since the discreteness is a stipulated a priori in causal set theory, it is certainly
not the case that the causal set programme adds any support to the hypothesis of discreteness.
But this brings us back to the problem how this assumption is justified via an inter-theoretic
agreement unless at least one of the competing theories is true. Either way, then, if we take the
causal set programme’s ambition to be the providing of a full quantum theory of gravity, then
any inter-theoretic concurrence about the discreteness of the fundamental structure cannot offer
any support for the programme’s stipulation. But perhaps such ambition is not harboured by the
programme and it merely strives to give a conceptually simple and clear line of attack to gain some
understanding of potential features of a full theory. If therefore no claim as to the truth of its basic
premises is implied, then this convergence can act as evidence for its physical relevance and thereby
justify interest in this approach.
Hence, none of these arguments offers direct evidence for discreteness. But this may not deter
us as ultimately, of course, the postulates of a theory are justified by the theory’s success. If the
theory aspires to be true and fundamental, only unconditional and complete empirical confirmation
will be able to elevate it to that status. If the theory is less ambitious and just aims to provide a
toy theory which usefully models some features that a more complete and fundamental theory is
expected to have, then it just needs to establish that these features reappear indeed in the fuller
theory and lend credence, either via theoretical or empirical support, to its claim to model them
with relevant similarity.
2.1 The kinematics of causal set theory
The fundamental structure is a causal set C, i.e. an ordered pair 〈C,〉 consisting of a set C of
elementary events and a relation, denoted by the infix , defined on C satisfying the following
conditions:
Axiom 1 (Partial ordering)  induces a partial order on C, i.e. it is reflexive (∀a ∈ C, a  a),
antisymmetric (∀a, b ∈ C, if a  b and b  a, then a = b), and transitive (∀a, b, c ∈ C, if a  b and
b  c, then a  c).
Axiom 2 (Local finitarity) ∀a, c ∈ C, card({b ∈ C|a  b  c}) <∞.
These two simple axioms determine the kinematics of causal set theory and have been motivated
above. Axiom 2 encodes the discreteness of causal sets. Interpreting the relation  causally, Axiom
6
Figure 1: (Almost) a Hasse diagram of a causal set
1 precludes any causal loops. In other words, time travel is ruled out by stipulation. This may or
may not be physically costly, but it should be noted that however causal set theory will relate back
to general relativity, it will not be able to reproduce the full theory as general relativity permits
time travel in the sense of causal loops (cf. Smeenk and Wu¨thrich 2011).
Causal sets can be illustrated by so-called Hasse diagrams, graph-theoretic representations of
finite partially ordered sets. In these diagrams, the vertices represent elements of C and edges
connecting the vertices represent their standing in relation . Since  is reflexive and transitive,
only a causal set’s ‘transitive reduction’ is drawn, i.e. we do not connect vertices directly which
are already connected via intermediate vertices.16 Furthermore, since it is understood that  is
reflexive, we also don’t clog the diagrams by drawing edges from each vertex back to itself. An
example of a simple causal set is represented in Figure 1. This is strictly speaking not a Hasse
diagram as its edges are adorned with arrowheads, which have been introduced in the present
context to emphasize the fact that the relation they represent is antisymmetric.
2.2 Steps towards a dynamics of the theory
Even though the basic kinematic rules in §2.1 give essentially the complete structure of causal
sets, they don’t give the full theory. Causal sets are dynamical entities in that they grow by the
‘birthing’ of additional elements to the causal future of the existing causal set. Among different
proposed dynamical rules, the classical sequential growth dynamics proposed by Rideout and Sorkin
(1999) has been most influential.17 In this dynamics, causal sets ‘grow’ by a discretized, stochastic
Markov process.18 This growth process starts out from the empty set and adds, one by one, new
elements to the future of the existing ones, following a directed path in Figure 2, which shows all
possible routes an evolution can take. More precisely, if an auxiliary, i.e. non-physical, external
time is introduced to label the events in order of their birth, then the events’ labels l ∈ N0 must
16The transitive closure of a binary relation R on a set X is the intersection of all transitive relations on X that
contain R. The transitive reduction of a binary relation R on a set X is the smallest relation on X which has the
same transitive closure as R.
17See also Varadarajan and Rideout 2006.
18A Markov process is a dynamical process whose transition amplitudes are such that the corresponding probabilities
satisfy a Markov condition, which states, roughly, that the probabilities for the transitions only depend upon the
‘initial’ and the ‘final’ state, but not on what transpired before the ‘initial’ state.
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Figure 2: The partially ordered set of finite causal sets (with the arrowheads within each causal
set now omitted)
obey the condition that if x  y, then l(x) ≤ l(y). This demand is called internal temporality. It
is important to note that the converse implication does not hold, as new events may be spacelike
related to all existing ones.
This labelling will introduce representational surplus structure in that e.g. the causal set in
the centre of the top line in Figure 2 can be reached via two different paths and hence can occur
with two inequivalent labellings.19 Causal set theorists codify their demand that the labels carry
no physical meaning in the requirement for discrete general covariance, which asserts that the
transition probability between two causal sets related dynamically as along a directed path as in
Figure 2 is path-independent insofar as the product of the transition probabilities along each path
must be the same. Discrete general covariance ensures that the labels used in the growth sequence
are ‘pure gauge’.20 This means that the true dynamical content of the theory is contained in, and
exhausted by, the transition amplitudes and not—emphatically—in the path along which a causal
set is thought to grow.
The structure P consisting of the set of finite causal sets representing all different dynamical
stages a growing causal set can assume is again partially ordered. The ordering relation is not a
causal relation as it was at the kinematic level, but instead a parent-child relation which takes finite
causal sets as it relata. Two finite causal sets are related by the parent-child relation just in case
one can be obtained form the other by accreting an event to the latter in accordance with internal
temporality. The structure P can again be represented by a Hasse diagram, as shown in Figure 2.
It should be clear that P has a first element—the empty set—, but no last element.
Furthermore, a condition of relativistic causality is typically imposed. Without going into any
technical detail here, the idea behind such a ‘Bell causality’ assumption is that what transpires at
spacelike separation from the node to which the newborn event is cemented ought not to influence
the corresponding transition amplitude. It can be shown that, together with discrete general
covariance, an intuitive notion of ‘Bell causality’ imposes strong constraints on the dynamics.21
19More precisely, three different labellings, since the third event could can related to either of the spacelike related
events in the causal set on the right of the card(C) = 2 generation.
20Cf. Rideout and Sorkin (1999), Brightwell et al. (2002).
21For the technical results, see Rideout and Sorkin (1999) and Varadarajan and Rideout (2006); for their founda-
tional appraisal, see Butterfield (2007).
8
All of this remains entirely classical, even though stochastic. No pretension is made to model
effects arising from quantum interference. No superpositions of causal sets are considered. Surely,
this gives us yet another reason for believing that causal set theory is not a serious contender for a
full quantum theory of gravity—at least not so long as no genuinely quantum dynamics is offered.
Researchers in causal set theory, of course, admit as much and often consider classical sequential
growth dynamics as a ‘warmup exercise’.
The classical sequential growth dynamics is just one among many possibilities to implement a
dynamical evolution in the theory. In an attempt to curb the number of possibilities, it, like others,
imposes constraints such as discrete general covariance and a Bell-type causal condition. These
constraining principles certainly appear eminently reasonable, but they lead to a serious problem:
it seems as if they prescribe dynamics that tend not to result in causal sets which give rise to
manifold-like spacetimes (Georgiou 2005). Let us address the issue of the emergence of classical
spacetimes from causal sets then.
2.3 The emergence of classical spacetimes from causal sets
For any quantum theory of gravity to succeed, it must be able to recover the classical spacetimes
of general relativity in the appropriate low-energy limit. Only if such a theory can show how
classical spacetimes emerge in the relevant sense—and thereby explain why general relativity is as
successful as it is—does it become a contender to supplant general relativity. Thus, studying the
relationship between discrete causal sets and continuum spacetimes constitutes an integral part of
the approach.22
What we would like to know, more specifically, is whether there exists an embedding of a given
causal set 〈C,〉 into some relativistic spacetime 〈M, gab〉, i.e. whether there is a map φ : C →M.23
This embedding should be faithful in that it satisfies the following three conditions:
(i) The causal relations are preserved, as follows: ∀a, b ∈ C, a  b iff φ(a) ∈ J−(φ(b)), where
J−(p) is the causal past of p, i.e. the set of points q ∈ M such that there exists a future-
directed causal curve from q to p (or q = p).
(ii) On average, φ maps one element of C onto each Planck-sized volume of 〈M, gab〉.
(iii) 〈M, gab〉 has no length scales smaller than the ‘discreteness scale’ of the causal set; for in-
stance, it is approximately flat below the Planck scale (the typical discreteness scale).
If the third condition is violated, then the relativistic spacetime has features that the causal set
cannot hope to retrieve—it simply lacks the resources to incorporate below Planck-scale phenomena.
If there is a faithful embedding of a causal set into a relativistic spacetime, it is common to say
that the causal set at stake is manifold-like.
The hope now is that if a faithful embedding of the causal set into a relativistic spacetime
exists, it is essentially unique insofar as if φ′ : C → M′ is a faithful embedding into another
relativistic spacetime 〈M′, g′ab〉, then the two spacetimes are approximately isometric, at least at
scales above the discreteness scale. This hope, captured in what is often referred to as the ‘causal
set hauptvermutung’, has so far not been substantiated by proof.
Moreover, as it turns out it is far from trivial to determine whether a given causal set indeed gives
rise to a relativistic spacetime. Because of this, let us consider the reverse direction from relativistic
22The term ‘emergence’ is not intended in the philosophers’ sense in which it designates a not even weak reducibility;
rather, it is used in the physicists’ sense of an umbrella term for reducibility broadly understood.
23For a recent review of the problem of the emergence of space in particular from causal sets, see Rideout and
Wallden 2009.
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spacetimes to causal sets in the hope to glean some lessons that may apply to the original direction.
In considering how to find a manifold-like causal set starting from a continuum spacetime, we first
notice that the general recipe to do this is by ‘sprinkling’ points onto the manifold approximately
in proportion to the volume of the spacetime regions. Next, the causal structure of the spacetime
is used to determine ordering relations among the sprinkled points, i.e. to establish the precedence
relation  among the sprinkled points. Using this recipe, we are guaranteed to obtain a causal set
that can be faithfully embedded into the spacetime from which we started out.
In order for the embedded causal set to be invariant under Lorentz transformations, not just
any old way of sprinkling will do. In particular, regular sprinkling patterns such as Planck-length-
spaced lattices will not be Lorentz invariant as the boosted lattice may have strongly varying
point densities across the manifold (Dowker et al. 2004). The way to protect the embedding
against a loss of Lorentz invariance is by sprinkling the points randomly. Causal set theory uses a
Poisson process where the probability of sprinkling N points into a spacetime volume is given by
a Poisson distribution. Since Poisson processes in Rn are invariant under any volume-preserving
map and the Minkowski volume element equals the Euclidean volume element in Rn, the Poisson
sprinkling exhibits exact Lorentz invariance for Minkowski spacetime (Dowker 2005, 451). Since
the volume element of general-relativistic spacetimes will not equal that of Euclidean space, the
Lorentz invariance of the sprinkling will in general only hold locally.
The question of the emergence of spacetimes from causal sets is riddled with what Smolin (2006,
211) has dubbed the inverse problem for causal sets, viz. the fact that almost no causal sets can be
faithfully embedded into a relativistic spacetime. This may in itself not constitute a severe problem,
if we had some physically well-motivated principle that permitted the selection of the subset of the
manifold-like causal sets among all kinematically or dynamically possible ones. As I mentioned in
§2.2, classical sequential growth dynamics fails to offer a dynamical mechanism that would drive
the causal sets to grow such as to render them manifold-like. Generally, causal set theory does not
have the resources to select in a principled way, or a dynamical principle to generate, those causal
sets that approximate low-dimensional relativistic spacetimes.24
3 A structuralist interpretation of causal set theory
It is straightforward to interpret the causal sets postulated by causal set theory in structuralist
terms, i.e. as structures.25 The domain O of the structure C is C, the set of elementary events,
and the set R of relations defined on the domain is exhausted by . For the structuralist, it
matters that the elements of C do not have intrinsic individuality—they are completely featureless
events which assume their identity merely by virtue of the position they occupy in the structural
complex C. The relation  is the only concrete physical relation. The structure of causal sets is
completely exhausted by the kinematic axioms Axiom 1 and Axiom 2, perhaps amended by the
dynamical rules specified in §2.2. It is thus evident that causal sets offer what is arguably the most
straightforwardly structuralist example of a physical entity postulated by any physical theory.
Of course, structuralist interpretations of the physics of other theories have been proposed.26 In
particular, it has been claimed that structuralism (or structural realism) about spacetime naturally
24The role of time and of the dynamical principles considered in causal set theory is a subtle business and will have
to be analyzed on another occasion.
25I am not the first to notice: cf. Brightwell et al. (2002, 8), Smolin (2006, §7.2.1), and Stachel (2006, §3.7). It
should be noted however, that the first two don’t make explicit use of the label ‘structuralism’, and the last one only
offers a rather concise assertion to this effect.
26E.g. general relativity, non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and quantum field theory; cf. Ladyman and Ross
(2007, Ch. 3), Esfeld and Lam (2008, 2011).
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dissolves the indeterminist trap into which a (naive) substantivalist stepped in the face of the hole
argument in general relativity, while still maintaining a form of realism about spacetime, thereby
avoiding a number of difficulties for the relationalist. According to the structuralist, spacetime
ought to be interpreted as a physical structure, i.e. as a structural complex constituted by physical
objects—the relata—and by the concrete physical relations in which they stand. Usually, this is
rendered as taking the points of the manifold M as the set of physical objects and the metrical,
i.e. spatio-temporal, as well as the dynamical properties they exemplify as the concrete physical
relations. As articulated, e.g., in Esfeld and Lam (2008, §2), spacetimes are thus identified with
an equivalence class of diffeomorphically related models of general relativity. The hole argument
trades on the intrinsic individuation of manifold points prior to, and independent of, the spatio-
temporal relations in which they stand. Such individuation is what forces the conclusion that
diffeomorphically-related models of general relativity must represent genuinely distinct physical
situation; and it is exactly this individuation which is denied by (all versions of) ontic structural
realism about spacetime.
It has been shown (Wu¨thrich 2009) that the important family of relativistic cosmological models
called Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) spacetimes challenge this structuralist inter-
pretation of spacetime. An important feature of these spacetimes is that the four-dimensional space-
time permits a privileged foliation into three-dimensional spaces parametrized by a one-dimensional
so-called cosmological time. Another important feature of them is that they encode the demand
issued by the ‘Cosmological Principle’ that, at any time, there be no privileged spatial location
in the universe. In other words, there cannot be any physical property had by any point in the
universe that is not also had by all other points at the same cosmological time. If a point cannot
differ in its properties, including its relational properties, from any other point in space, then the
‘Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles’ (PII) appears to demand that they be identified. PII
holds that for any two objects, if they share all—possibly relational—properties, then they are
identical. If sound, this argument establishes that the spacetime structuralist is committed to the
absurd claim that FLRW spacetimes consist of only one point for any given value of cosmological
time—a pointlike universe!27
It has been suggested, most vigorously in Muller 2011, that the introduction of irreflexive
relations resolves the difficulty insofar as these relations render the relata weakly discernible, i.e.
the relata are numerically distinct by virtue of them exemplifying an irreflexive relation.28 The
symmetry problem disappears since for an irreflexive relation to be exemplified at all, there must
be two numerically distinct objects. There is the general worry with this resolution, of course, that
the assumption of there being an irreflexive relation exemplified in the physical structure at stake
means, eo ipso, that there are two numerically distinct objects exemplifying the relation.29 If the
point of this resolution was that numerical plurality was to be derived, rather than stipulated, then
it seems to fail.
In causal set theory, the only physically admissible fundamental relation is reflexive, thus not
directly amenable to the move proposed by Muller. But it is straightforward to concoct an irreflexive
relation from a reflexive one. First, define the reflexive reduction R 6= of a binary relation R over
27There are several ways to evade the strictures of this argument, as explained in Wu¨thrich 2009. One could, of
course, assert that identity (or at least numerical plurality) is primitive, as do e.g. Leitgeb and Ladyman (2008), thus
rendering the application of PII otiose. I wish to thank an anonymous referee for keeping me honest on this point. I
shall assume, in what follows, that identity is contextual rather than primitive.
28A binary relation R on a set X is irreflexive just in case ∀x ∈ X,¬Rxx.
29To claim that weak discernibility may be used to introduce an identity relation to a language without identity
amounts to an insistence that the pertinent relation is primitively irreflexive. Thus, just as in footnote 27, such a
claim is tantamount to accepting non-structural facts, a possibility I acknowledge without pursuing it here.
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a set X as R \ {〈x, x〉|x ∈ X}, i.e. the reflexive reduction R 6= of a possibly reflexive relation R is
exemplified by exactly the same pairs of objects as R except for those pairs when the objects in
both slots of the binary relation are identical. In fact, some authors contributing to the physics
literature on causal sets characterize the fundamental relation exactly as the reflexive reduction of
the one defined in Axiom 1.30
Second, convince yourself that not much physically hangs on whether the fundamental relation
is reflexive or irreflexive. To this end, define a strict partial order as a binary relation that is
irreflexive and transitive, and hence asymmetric.31 If we denote strictly ordered causal sets ordered
pairs 〈C,≺〉 of sets C of elementary events endowed with a strict partial ordering relation, denoted
by the infix ≺, and satisfying Axiom 2, then there is a bijective correspondence between causal sets
and strictly ordered causal sets. To see this, suppose the set C is the same for both. Then given the
reflexive relation  inducing a non-strict partial order on C, we can always introduce an irreflexive
relation ≺ given by the reflexive reduction 6= such that ∀x, y ∈ C, x ≺ y just in case x  y and
x 6= y. Conversely, given the irreflexive relation ≺ inducing a strict partial order on C, we can
always introduce a reflexive relation  given by the reflexive closure ≺= such that ∀x, y ∈ C, x  y
just in case x ≺ y or x = y. Generally, the reflexive closure R= of a binary relation R over a set
X is defined as {〈x, x〉|x ∈ X} ∪R, i.e. the reflexive closure R= of a possibly irreflexive relation R
is exemplified by those pairs of objects which either exemplify R or take identical objects in both
slots.
It is clear that a causal set C = 〈C,〉 cannot be isomorphic to its strictly partially ordered
counterpart Cs = 〈C,≺〉 since no map between them will preserve the one and only relation of the
structure either way. Thus, strictly speaking, causal set theory and ‘strict causal set theory’ are
inequivalent as they describe non-isomorphic structures. But to conclude from this that there is any
physically interesting difference between either these two theories or the structures they describe
would nevertheless be misguided as the theories are still empirically equivalent.32 It appears to
make good empiricist sense to be indifferent regarding a possible preference between causal set
theory and its strict cousin. Thus, causal set theorists might as well have formulated the entire
theory in terms of a basic relation that is irreflexive.33
Returning to the symmetry problem, and ignoring the general worry concerning Muller’s fix
based on weak discernibility above, the structuralist may therefore hope that she has been handed
the necessary tools to deal with the symmetry problem. Upon inspection, however, one quickly
notes that the irreflexivity of the one and only physical relation only affords a partial resolution of
the problem. Suppose the causal set exhibits a high degree of synchronic symmetry in that every
element in a given ‘horizontal’ generation Gi exemplifies exactly the same relational properties as
any element of the same generation, as depicted in Figure 3, where points represent the elements of
C and the arrows between them the relation ≺ (rather than ). This leads directly to a problem
of synchronic plurality in that the PII suggests, once again, for causal sets relevantly like the one
depicted in Figure 3, that each generation Gi consists of just one element. It seems as if on a
purely structuralist reading, and using PII, for all the generations Gi, all the points in it ought
to be identified. This was essentially the symmetry problem as encountered for highly symmetric
spacetimes in general relativity. Note that there is no analogous problem of diachronic plurality,
since ≺ is asymmetric. It is of course no surprise that within a generation, the irreflexive relation
does not dissolve the difficulty, as it cannot obtain between spacelike separated elements.
30Cf. e.g. Dowker et al. (2004).
31A binary relation R on a set X is asymmetric just in case ∀x, y ∈ X, if Rxy, then ¬(Ryx).
32Exercise for the reader: try to exploit the difference between causal set theory and its strict analogue to define
an empirically tangible difference of the emergent spacetimes that they engender.
33And in fact, some do: cf. footnote 30.
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Figure 3: A symmetric causal set
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Figure 4: A growing causal set
It is worth noting that in slightly less symmetric cases, such as the one of an ‘expanding’
universe as in Figure 4, not all points within a generation ought to be identified—even though
there are subsets of points in each generation that share a relational profile. In generation G1 in
Figure 4, for instance, the leftmost and the rightmost points share all genuine physical properties
and should thus be identified, in accordance with PII. The same applies to the two central points.
Instead of the four points represented in G1 in Figure 4, therefore, PII only identifies two events in
the corresponding generation of the physical structure. This may serve as an indication that the
strict symmetry is rather fragile in the sense that the vast majority of admissible causal sets do not
exhibit symmetries challenging a structuralist interpretation.
Concerning potential problems of diachronic plurality, it was noted in §2.1 that the antisymme-
try assumed in Axiom 1 prohibits causal loops. But even if antisymmetry is dropped, a structuralist
interpretation of causal set theory deprives the theory of the resources to deal with causal loops,
for reason essentially the same as for the symmetric causal sets.
To see why, let us suppose that antisymmetry is omitted from Axiom 1.34 We are then left
with what is called a transitive digraph. If a causal set is merely a transitive digraph (rather than a
partially ordered set), then there will be, in general, cycles in the sense that ∃a, b, c ∈ C, a ≺ b ≺ c ≺
a. As a result of transitivity, any points a and b on the cycle will be relationally indistinguishable:
∀x, y ∈ C, if x ≺ a, then x ≺ b and vice versa, and if a ≺ y, then b ≺ y.35 Since points on loops can
thus not differ in their relational profiles and the structuralist assumes that the elementary events
of causal sets are intrinsically featureless, PII entails that all points on a loops are identical. But of
course if all points on a loop are one and the same, then there is no loop, but just a lonely point.
This means, quite generally, that transitive-digraph causal set theory cannot distinguish between
causal loops and points in a causal set. Thus, either causal loops are ruled out ab initio (as they
typically are, by assuming antisymmetry), or they immediately collapse to points, at least as long
as we insist that elementary events have no intrinsic identity.
Since there are spacetimes with causal loops in general relativity and the points on these curves
can be distinguished metrically (for instance by their distance to a fiducial point), no causal set could
ever give rise to a spacetime-cum-causal loops, regardless of whether this causal set is conceived of
as a partially ordered set or a transitive digraph. That a causal approach to discrete spacetime such
as causal set theory cannot deal with closed timelike curves is not surprising, since these approaches
are built upon Malament’s (1977) insight that the metric is fixed, up to a conformal factor, by the
causal structure—but only for spacetimes which satisfy a slightly stronger condition than that they
34I wish to thank Fay Dowker for substantive discussions on this point.
35This is so because causal sets are ‘transitively closed’ (cf. footnote 16).
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do not contain causal loops.
Even though the symmetry problem thus resurfaces in causal set theory, the fragility mentioned
three paragraphs ago indicates that the problem is not as grave as it is in general relativity. There,
the symmetric spacetimes a` la FLRW are arguably of measure zero in the space of all admissible
spacetime models—even though the space of solutions to the Einstein field equations remains
unknown. To take this as ground for dismissing the difficulty, however, was particularly unpalatable
in general relativity since the FLRW models are of such great theoretical importance (Wu¨thrich
2009).
Returning to causal set theory, just how generic are these highly symmetric causal sets among
all the kinematically possible ones? Even though this issue is hard to tackle analytically, one
naturally conjectures that the fraction of highly symmetric causal sets quickly becomes very small
as the cardinality of C increases. Moreover, there is no reason to think that these highly symmetric
possibilities are of particular physical relevance, as generic or non-generic these may be. In fact,
there are grounds for thinking that they are not physically relevant: even FLRW and similarly
symmetric spacetimes generically emerge from causal sets not exhibiting these perfect symmetries.
That this is so is suggested by the fact that a faithful embedding of a causal set into a manifold
can straightforwardly be obtained by randomly sprinkling points (at an appropriate density) into
an FLRW spacetime and asserting causal relations between any pair of them according to the light
cone structure. This will generate, ex constructione, a causal set that is faithfully embeddable
into the FLRW spacetime. The random sprinkling, importantly, is required to guarantee the local
Lorentz symmetry, as a sprinkling onto a regular lattice would not leave the average number of
points in a volume invariant under Lorentz transformations.36
The fact that causal sets thus necessitate a certain irregularity gives the structuralist reassurance
that the symmetry problem vanishes in causal set theory. This, in turn, indicates that the problem
may disappear altogether in a full theory of quantum gravity.
4 Zooming out: implications for structural realism
By way of conclusion, I wish to step back and take (admittedly preliminary) stock of the situation
for the structuralist with respect to fundamental theories of gravity, as well as more generally in
philosophy of science. In order to do that, let me distinguish two different structures that might be
relevant here. First, a particular model of a theory is a mathematical structure that is claimed, by
the theory, to represent a physically possible world according to that theory. Second, the theory
itself, i.e. the set of models, has a structure. This structure, too, is a mathematical structure
encoded in the mathematical formulation of the theory. The mathematical structure of the theory
and that of its models may of course be related, but they need not be. Applied to causal set theory,
the structure of a model of the theory is the structure of a particular causal set as explicated
in the previous section.37 The structure of causal set theory, on the other hand, is captured by
the structure of the set of kinematically admissible causal sets, i.e. of the causal sets complying
with Axioms 1 and 2, or perhaps by the partially ordered structure P structure of dynamically
possible causal sets, i.e. of sequences of causal sets conforming to the sequential growth dynamics
as explicated in §2.2.38
36In fact, the causal set depicted in Figure 3 is not even manifold-like (Henson 2009, §1.3).
37In fact, we may distinguish between kinematic and dynamic models; the former being just causal sets, while the
latter would be sequences of causal sets.
38One may reasonably think that any theory purporting to recover general relativity in some limit could only
succeed in doing so if appropriate dynamical aspects of the latter are regained as well. The role of dynamics in
understanding just how general-relativistic spacetimes emerge from causal sets defies, so far, satisfactory explication.
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Naively, a theory that purports to recover general relativity in a classical limit should do more
than catalog kinematically admissible states. One would think that dynamics is essential in this
endeavor.
Instead of the more ambitious goal of offering a wholesale solution to negotiate the competing
demands of realist and antirealist arguments to which Worrall (1989) aspired, we may more mod-
estly seek to formulate retail interpretations of particular physical theories, one by one. What has
been offered above was intended in the spirit of the latter. This more modest goal is both more
promising and more appropriate.39 More promising because in order to make headway on the first
ambition, we are faced with a number of apparently insurmountable obstacles, while the latter goal
can be, and in some cases, has been, achieved. More appropriate since there is no guarantee for any
universal attitude towards scientific theories in general that it will succeed in that either it correctly
licenses the theories’ epistemic pretensions or at least furthers our understanding of science.
Putting aside modesty for a moment, what would be required for a structural realist to suc-
cessfully steer clear of the antirealist threat arising from past false theories? About which of the
structures identified in the first paragraph of this section ought we be realist? Answering this sec-
ond question first, it seems clear that the realism should be directed at the structure of particular
models rather than of the theory and hence of the entire set of models. Unless we assume that
the sum total of existence consists of a set of physically possible worlds the structure of which our
best scientific theory must reproduce, unless, that is, we are some sort of modal realists and our
modal realism dictates our philosophy of science, I see little motivation to be realist about the
entire abstract structure of the mathematical formulation of the theory at stake. This is a rather
deep point, a point that has recently been come under pressure from various quarters, and a point
that most certainly deserves further consideration than it can be given here.
But if I am right in rejecting a need for realism concerning the entire structure of a theory,
then even a wholesale structural realism should focus its realism on particular model, or perhaps
models, that are thought to represent aspects of the world. Since the realism is structural, the claim
must be that the model(s) correctly represent(s) the structure of the physical world. In the now
standard terminology of Shapiro (1997), the structural realist must thus be an in re structuralist,
i.e. must maintain that the abstract structure of the model is instantiated in the physical world.
In other words, the structural realist posits an isomorphism between the model(s) and the aspects
of the world represented. We should of course never expect that any model of any scientific theory
is fully isomorphic to the world. Rather, the claim should be that there exist substructures in the
world and that the model is isomorphic to that substructure or that there are several models of
the theory, all of which are isomorphic to different substructures of the world.40 Of course, the
challenge is to correctly identify the substructure in the world with which the model is supposed to
be isomorphic, all the while avoiding the risk of trivializing the isomorphic achievement by insisting
on some criterion of explanatory strength. I leave the details of this tricky, but crucial, step to
some other occasion.
Even in the absence of a principled account of how to identify the pertinent substructures in the
world, for the wholesale structural realist to meet the antirealist challenge, there must be isomor-
phisms between substructures of the models of succeeding theories in the relevant sense in order
to underwrite the necessary structural continuity across scientific revolutions. While once again I
see, to put it mildly, little hope to fulfill the ambitions of establishing the relevant isomorphisms
This is a restatement of the problem mentioned, and deferred, in footnote24. I thank an anonymous referee for
pressing me on this point.
39I am not alone in this view; cf. Esfeld and Lam (2008, 2011).
40A substructure T of a structure S = 〈S,R〉 is an ordered pair 〈T,R|T 〉 consisting of a domain T ⊂ S and the set
R of relations restricted to T .
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quite in general, abstracted away from particular scientific theories, progress may be achieved by
studying particular cases of transitions from one theory to its successor. Above, we identified good
reasons not to take causal set theory as offering a true fundamental theory of quantum gravity and
instead to consider it a toy theory which may reveal some aspects of such a theory. For the sake
of illustrating the point, pretend it did offer such a full theory and supplanted general relativity as
our best theory of gravity. The task, then, is to show this structural continuity in the imagined
transition from general relativity to causal set theory.
Again, it is clear that models in the two theories cannot be fully isomorphic. First, general-
relativistic models are much richer structures with their domains being the points of four-dimensional
differentiable, and therefore continuous, manifolds. This means that there is a mathematically pre-
cise sense in which there are many more elementary events than in a causal set. Additionally,
these ‘extra’ events also exemplify physical relations, thus dashing any hope of full isomorphism.
Moreover, general-relativistic structures contain more relations, including those arising from the
Einstein field equations, than do those of causal set theory. If there is structural continuity between
the two, then it must manifest itself in the form of partial isomorphisms between their models, i.e.
of isomorphisms between causal sets and substructures of the general-relativistic spacetimes. This
brings us back to the problem of how causal sets give rise to spacetimes discussed in §2.3.
There, we have noted that most causal sets are not manifold-like and that it remains unclear
how there could be dynamical or otherwise physical mechanisms that choose those causal sets which
do indeed give rise to classical spacetimes. If we believe that general relativity is a successful theory
insofar as it contains models which faithfully describe most aspects of spatio-temporal structure as
we find it in the actual world—and so we should—, then any quantum theory of gravity will have
to let those models emerge in a principled manner. I will not offer a solution to this problem today,
but hasten to insist that solving it will mean to address the wanted structural continuity between
the models of the two theories.
The example of the relationship between causal sets and relativistic spacetimes thus illustrates
how particular cases of related theories, such as those related by succession, may be much more
fruitful than any aggrandizing general argument as to how successive theories must in general
relate to one another: by identifying which causal sets may be structurally related to relativistic
spacetimes, we may hope to elucidate the problem of emergence addressed in §2.3.
In conclusion, let me emphasize again that structuralism may proffer a natural interpretation
of particular physical theories such as causal set theory, and perhaps even shed light on particular
instances of transitions between succeeding theories. Little can be found, however, in causal set
theory and how it relates to relativistic spacetime theories that would rekindle hope for using
structuralism as a fully general template in the philosophy of science.
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